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Abstract 
The dynamic trade-off view of capital structure is based on partial adjustment models that find 
that firms adjust towards target levels. In this paper, we estimate the speed of adjustment based 
on the first difference of the lead leverage levels (actual lead) and lag leverage levels (actual lag) 
to the first difference of simulated lead (target) leverage levels and lag levels (actual lag 
leverage) for UK firms. Consistent with the literature we find that firms adjust the lag (current) 
leverage levels faster to lead levels when they are above lead levels relative to periods when they 
are below lead levels. This is due to managerial actions in minimizing present value of 
bankruptcy costs when firms are over-levered. Bringing in the market timing view of capital 
structure, we measure deviation of market prices to predicted theoretical values, and find that 
speed of adjustment is influenced by equity mispricing. We find that firms adjust faster to lead 
levels when lag levels are above lead levels and the extent of deviation above theoretical values 
is not excessive relative to when deviations of prices from theoretical levels are too high. 
Furthermore, looking at firms below lead levels, we find that firms adjust faster to lead levels 
when equities prices below theoretical values severely deviate; suggesting that firms increase 
debt issues when equity prices are acutely suppressed. This indicates managers are consistently 
looking at windows of opportunities when issuing or repurchasing to ensure successful timing 
attempts. Thus, our findings suggest that although market timing could also work within a trade-
off framework where managers are timing based on the deviation from theoretical prices as well 
as moving towards simulated lead levels, the extent of the integration of both explanations of 
capital structure remains puzzling.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the speed of adjustment to lead (target) leverage levels for UK firms. We 
empirically test the adjustment levels for firms which are above and under lead levels whilst 
measuring the extent of deviation of market prices from theoretical prices. Our tests attempt to 
explain the movement to lead levels at differing speeds whilst incorporating market timing 
attempts by managers. We assume that managers have superior levels of information and thus 
are able to exploit windows of opportunity to time the equity market which are in line with 
targeting behaviour.  
The trade-off theory of capital structure posits that managers are trading off the benefits and 
costs of debt to reach an optimal level. However, empirical studies have shown that firms often 
deviate from lead levels and do not rapidly adjust to target levels (see Flannery and Rangan, 
2006 and Huang and Ritter, 2009). This could be due costs of adjustment impeding firms from 
reaching target levels. Direct evidence of costs of adjustments impeding firms from reaching 
target levels is provided in Haas and Peeters (2006) who show that exogenous factors influence 
speed of adjustment to target levels. In addition, Camara (2012) show differing speed of 
adjustment for multinational corporations versus domestic corporations who face impediments 
from reach target levels. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) provide further evidence of non-linear speed 
of adjustment where firms with high levels of default risk or expected bankruptcy costs and high 
levels of opportunity costs of deviating from target levels adjust more rapidly to target levels. 
Oztekin and Flannery (2011) further show that better institutions lower transaction costs which 
allow firms with access to better institutional factors adjust more rapidly to target levels relative 
to firms without access. Similar to the findings of Warr et al. (2012), we hypothesize that 
deviation of market prices from fundamental values which impacts cost of equity as an 
adjustment cost. However, our paper distinguishes the extent of mispricing and finds strong 
empirical evidence to support our notion. Managers are acutely aware of the extent of mispricing 
and react in a distinctive pattern to time issues in order to reach target levels. Our motivation is 
derived from the evidence of non-linear timing of the equity markets by managers documented in 
the literature (see Hussain and Jabarullah, 2013 and Hussain, 2014). To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to show that speed of adjustment to target levels although affected by 
equity mispricing, works in a non-linear manner.  
Similar to our expectations and consistent with the literature, we find that firms that are above 
target levels tend to adjust faster in the presence of overvaluation relative to periods of 
undervaluation. However distinguishing firms based on the extent of overvaluation, we find that 
the speed of adjustment to only be significantly faster when the extent of overvaluation is not 
severe. This indicates that firms do not increase equity issues in the event of severe overpricing. 
This could be an indication of the signalling effect where managers do not believe that prices can 
be sustained at these levels if an equity announcement were to be made. Looking at firms below 
target levels, our findings concur with the literature where firms adjust more rapidly to target 
levels in periods of undervaluation. Dissecting the sample further, we find that this is only true 
when equities are severely deflated suggesting that managers are reluctant to rely on debt. It 
could be that financial flexibility is being preserved. 
Our paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the relevant literature and the 
motivation for the study. We then describe the data, provide the variable definitions, discuss the 
valuation model and detail our empirical model. Following that, we present and discuss our 
results. Finally we conclude the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION OF STUDY 
This section looks at the literature on the rate of adjustment to target leverage levels and the 
equity market timing explanation of capital structure. Although the trade-off theory states that 
firms have target leverage levels, empirical studies have found that firms may temporarily 
deviate away from these levels. Adjustments to target levels are often impeded by market 
imperfections and adjustment costs. Given that there remains contentious debate on the rate of 
adjustment to target levels in the literature; our paper looks at the extent of deviation of market 
prices from intrinsic value to and its effect on adjustment costs. 
Equity market timing 
The equity market timing theory of capital structure argues that the current capital structure of a 
firm is the cumulative outcome of previous timing attempts by managers (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Based on this explanation of capital structure, managers tend to favour equity when 
valuations are high and debt when valuation levels are low. It is assumed that given that 
managers are acting in shareholders’ interests, they are able to identify windows of opportunities 
where equities are mispriced and hence time security issues to coincide with these periods of 
mispricing. These windows of opportunity may arise as investors do not fully incorporate 
information into decision making leading to the possibility of irrational investors making 
investment decisions (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Further support for the theory is provided in 
Hovakimian (2006), who finds that Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the US are strongly 
correlated to equity prices.  
The theory is however not without contention. Flannery and Rangan (2006) show that half of the 
changes in capital structure can be explained by targeting behaviour and attribute only about a 
tenth to market timing attempts. Alti (2006) further shows that although managers are timing 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), they tend to revert to target levels in a couple of years after the 
IPO event. In a more relevant study, Hussain and Jabarullah (2013) show that UK firms tend to 
only increase reliance on equity issues during periods of slight overvaluation and opt for debt 
issues during periods of severe undervaluation. Thus, the literature provides no clear distinction 
on the validity of the market timing explanation of capital structure.  
Speed of adjustment 
In a survey of UK firms, Brounen et al. (2006) find that managers take into account target levels 
of leverage when issuing debt indicating that firms do indeed have target leverage levels. 
However firms often deviate from target levels and are unable to fully adjust back to target levels 
due to adjustment costs. Leary and Roberts (2005) further use a dynamic duration model to show 
that financing behaviour is consistent the presence of adjustment costs to target levels. 
Faulkender et al. (2007) suggest that a possible reason for firms to deviate from target levels 
would be (although managers have a target level of leverage in mind) to time security issues 
within a band around the target.  
Chang et al. (2006) find that firms that receive less analyst coverage issue equity less frequently 
and issues are clumped in large issues. The authors show that given this situations, managers 
would be inclined to time equity issues when market conditions are considered to be favourable. 
This is due to firms which receive less analyst coverage would face higher levels of information 
asymmetry and thus their share prices would be subject to greater levels of mispricing. In the 
event that equity becomes under-valued; firms would be inclined to issue debt and thus be forced 
to move away from target levels to finance their deficit. Once equity prices have recovered, 
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managers would then be motivated to issue equity and thus reduce the extent of deviation from 
target levels. Furthermore, even if higher levels of valuations would move firms closer to target 
market leverage levels, managers would still have the inclination to issue more equity in 
anticipation of future difficulty in issuing.  
In another recent study, Binsbergen et al. (2010) further show that the cost of being over-levered 
is higher than the cost of being under-levered suggesting that speed of adjustment for firms 
above target levels would be faster relative to firms below their target levels. This notion is 
supported in Byoun (2008) who finds that most of the adjustment to target levels occurs if firms 
have a financing surplus (deficit) and are over-levered (under-levered). Warr et al. (2012) test 
how equity mispricing affects speed of adjustment. They find that firms adjust faster to target 
levels when firms are above target levels and equities are overvalued (relative to periods of 
undervaluation). Looking at firms which are under-levered, the authors provide empirical 
evidence that firms tend to adjust faster to target levels when equities are undervalued relative to 
periods of overvaluation. Based on the findings of the authors, we similarly hypothesize that 
equity mispricing as altering the cost of adjustment to target levels. Drawing from Hussain 
(2014), we conjecture that the extent of mispricing directly influences managerial actions and 
hence the speed of adjustment to target levels. Thus speed of adjustment is a function of 
mispricing, conditional to the extent of mispricing. 
 
3. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
We start our sample by including all UK firms that are available in the Datastream Thomson 
Rueters database to maximize our number of firm – year observations. The time period ranges 
from 1993 – 2012 as pre-1993 data is scarcely available. The sample is selected based on data 
availability and our objective of measuring equity mispricing as well as estimating the speed of 
adjustment. In order to avoid survivorship and selection bias, we include dead firms in our 
sample. We exclude all financial firms as is the practice in the literature of capital structure 
studies in the UK. Furthermore, consistent with the literature, our observations are based on the 
financial year-end of each individual firm. In line with Faulkender et al. (2012) we winsorize all 
ratios at the 1st and 99th percentile to eliminate the influence of outliers and the possibility of 
miscoded observations. Additionally, given that we are using the Blundell and Bond (1998) two 
– step system GMM to estimate target leverage; as well as the residual income model, the data 
will have a self-imposed survivorship bias of 4-year continuous observations. Our analysis also 
excludes observations with missing data. Our final sample comprises of 1.526 firms with 16,246 
firm-year observations. The summary statistics of firm specific characteristics and leverage 
levels are summarized in Table 1.  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Our study uses unbalanced panel data to allow us to more accurately capture firms timing 
behaviour due to econometric efficiency, better inference of model parameters and as a limitation 
on omitted variable bias which acts as a control for missing or unobservable variables. Variables 
used in this study are defined based on the literature. Firms’ SIZE is the natural logarithm of net 
sales in millions of 1993 pounds. TANG, asset tangibility is net plant, property and equipment 
over total assets. R&D (research and development expenses) is scaled by total assets. The 
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market-to-book ratio (MTB) is defined as Ratio of book value of total assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity (M) to book value of total assets (B). 
Equity mispricing 
Our study utilizes the residual income model in order to measure fundamental values of equity 
(Elliott et al. 2007, 2008). To measure the deviation from fundamental prices, we define the 
mispricing (MISP) variable as the ratio of intrinsic value of equity to the current market price of 
a given share (refer to D’Mello and Shroff, 2000, for a detailed review of the residual income 
model). Furthermore, we draw from Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2000) in order to decompose the 
market-to-book ratio to two components which separate growth and a measure of valuation. This 
avoids any ambiguity problems (i.e. growth). Thus, the first component (value-to-market) is of 
particular interest to our study.  
Based on the above, we are able to define the intrinsic value of a particular equity based on 
Elliott et al. (2007, 2008) as follows: 
                  (1) 
The terminal value, TV from the above expression is calculated as follows: 
                             (2) 
where IV0 is the intrinsic value of the firm’s equity at time 0, BE0 is the book value of equity at 
time 0, k is the cost of equity, and EE0(Ii) is the expected earnings for period t at time 0. Time 0 
is defined as the previous fiscal year and set T to equal 2 years. Similar to Elliott et al. (2007, 
2008) our study incorporates 3 years of future growth earnings. The authors reason that given 
that the residual income model does not capitalize raw earnings but employs abnormal earnings 
(similar to the Economic Value Added approach), 3 years is not too short a time period to 
capture all future potential growth opportunities of a given firm. Drawing further from their 
study, we utilize the perfect foresight version of the residual income model (see D’Mello and 
Shroff, 2000). Thus our definition of BE is the book value of equity and Ii is defined as income 
before extraordinary items.  
We further employ a similar approach in using the ex-post realization of earnings in order to 
maximise sample size. However this approach suffers from several drawbacks, mainly the issue 
of endogeneity. This issue nonetheless provides a bias against our study of finding any evidence 
of market timing, given that further debt issues would depress future earnings due to the 
commitment of interest payments. To estimate the cost of equity capital, k, we use the Fama and 
French (1997) three factor model. Our results are robust to using a single factor model. We proxy 
for the risk free rate using short – term treasury bills. The terminal value from expression (2) is 
calculated as the average value of the last 2 years of the finite series and we restrict our sample to 
positive values, as using negative values would imply that managers are continuously investing 
in negative NPV projects. In order to proxy for managers more informed expectations relative to 
investors, we use future realized earnings by assuming perfect and unbiased foresight by 
managers. Our approach is justified as the purpose of the MISP variable is to measure the extent 
of deviation from intrinsic value rather than to create a trading rule. Furthermore, to complement 
and confirm our results, we test for robustness using analyst forecasted earnings (consensus) data 
obtained from Bloomberg at the beginning of the financial year. Our test of robustness is in line 
with the approach used in the literature (see Lee et al. 1999, D’Mello and Shroff, 2000 and 
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Elliott et al. 2007). This approach however suffers from the drawback of a reduced sample size 
due to the limited number of firms covered by analysts.  
Target leverage and speed of adjustment 
The trade-off theory of capital structure argues for a target level of leverage where firms would 
continuously issue (retire) securities in order to reach an optimal level of leverage. The speed of 
adjustment to target levels is dependent on costs of adjustment. The main notion of this paper 
looks at cost of equity (via equity mispricing) as an adjustment cost towards target levels. Thus 
we model the lead variable ( ) based on Fama and French (2002) as well as 
Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Similar to Warr et al (2012) we contend that equity mispricing and managerial timing attempts 
alters the cost of adjustment to target levels. However, given that our main contention lies with 
the integration of the market timing theory of capital structure, based on previous studies (see 
Hussain and Jabarullah, 2013 and Hussain 2014) with the trade-off theory; our empirical model 
is thus aimed at measuring the speed of adjustment to target leverage subject to the extent of 
equity mispricing. We utilize the following model to measure speed of adjustment as follows 
(see Flannery and Rangan, 2006 and Warr et al, 2012): 
        (3) 
where  is the debt ratio in period t+1 for firm i, and  is the target 
leverage ratio in period t+1 for firm i. The difference between the two variables is the amount 
the debt ratio must change to allow firms to be back on target. Similar to Warr et al (2012) we 
use a 2-stage model to estimate speed of adjustment. In the initial stage, target leverage 
( ) is estimated using the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) method. The use of two differing methods for estimating speed of adjustment is for 
robustness purposes. The literature documents that the Blundell and Bond (1998) method is able 
to tackle dynamic panel data bias (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The second stage uses the target 
leverage ratios which are bifurcated based on the valuation measure to estimate differences in 
speed of adjustment (based on equation (3)). The variables used to estimate   
in the first stage are firm size, asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, research and development 
expenses and industry median leverage for book (MEDBL) and market leverage (MEDML) 
(similar to Hovakimian et al, 2001 and Hovakimian and Li (2011).  
We estimate both book leverage (BL) and market leverage (ML) where BL, is defined as book 
leverage divided by total assets and (ML), is measured as the ratio of book value of total debt to 
market value of equity plus book value of total debt. In line with the literature discussed above, 
to control for endogeneity issues, our estimations are done over the year following the mispricing 
measure (MISP). Furthermore, we lag all our control variables by 1 to avoid the possibility of 
reverse causality affecting the results.   
Estimation model 
In order to estimate target leverage levels at t+1 as the lead variable, we utilize two alternative 
methods as a measure of robustness. As discussed above, the first method is adapted from Fama 
and French (2002); who in turn utilize the method from Fama and MacBeth (1973). The target 
leverage levels are based on cross-sectional regressions of annual observations. The model is 
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expressed as follows based on the determinants described above as well as 15 industry dummies 
with the value of [1,0]: 
(4) 
Appendix A details the industry classifications which are similar to Hussain (2014) and based on 
Thomson Rueters Datastream classifications. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable (RDD) 
which takes the value of 1 for firms where research and development expenses are not available 
and 0 otherwise (see Alti, 2006). To further control for specific target levels at industry level, we 
include the  variables which is the industry median leverage at time t for firm i. The second 
method is based on the Blundell and Bond (1998); utilizing the 2-step system GMM estimator. 
Consider the basic model based on the autoregressive method: 
          (5) 
where  is the lead variable for book and market leverage (target leverage at t+1) for firm i,   
 is the lag variable for book and market leverage (actual leverage at t) for firm i, 
 is a vector of explanatory variables as discussed above and similar to 
equation (4) at time t for firm i,  are the unobservable firm-specific characteristics which are 
time invariant such as firm reputation and management ability for firm i at time t,  represents 
the effects which are time specific such as shocks in the economy and inflation rates for firm i at 
time t which affects all firms and can vary across time and  is the error term which is assumed 
to be serially uncorrelated with mean values of zero and variance . We utilize 2-step system 
GMM as OLS estimation of equation (5) would result in the coefficients being biased as  is 
not directly observable and has a correlation with the other regressors in the model (Hsiao, 
1985). Furthermore, there is a correlation between  with  which would lead to inconsistent 
coefficients being estimated.  
One possible solution would be to take first differences of the variables in order to eliminate 
fixed effects which are time-invariant ( ). This method would still suffer from inefficiencies 
due to the correlation between the first difference of the error term ( ) and the first difference 
of the leverage level of firm i at time t ( . This is due to the assumption of exogeneity of OLS 
for all explanatory variables. This is a flawed assumption as random effects that affect the 
dependent variable are also most likely to affect the explanatory variables as well. Another 
possible solution is proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982); which is through the use of the 
instrument variable technique (IV). However, the IV method can still lead to inefficient 
estimations as it does not utilize all available moment conditions. Another alternative solution is 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The authors suggest that the use of GMM which allows 
additional instruments. The instruments are obtained by using the orthogonal conditions that are 
present between the disturbances and the lagged dependent variable. Thus, we are able to find 
the true parameter for the GMM method by identifying the elements of the parameter space 
where the linear combinations of the sample cross products are ‘as close to zero as possible’ 
(Hansen, 1982). GMM is an advantageous method as it is able to optimally exploit all the linear 
moment restrictions which are specified in the model. We assume that the error term ( ) is 
zero as the consistency of the GMM estimator assumes the absence of second-order correlation 
in differences and the first-order correlation in levels.  
We investigate the Sargan’s test to identify the use of over identifying restrictions in order to 
ensure there is no higher-order serial correlation to have a valid set of instruments independent of 
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the residuals. We do not utilize the one-step GMM estimators given that the error terms are 
expected to show heteroscedasticity in large sample data with a relatively long time span (see 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). The two-step approach allows us to use one-step residuals to 
construct asymptotically matrices which are optimally weighted which leads to efficiency over 
the one-step approach. Thus, the use of two-step system GMM allows the control of 
heteroscedasticy over the sample, correlation of errors over observed time, measurement errors 
due to utilization of orthogonal conditions on the variance-covariance matrix and simultaneity.  
Our preference for the two-step system GMM over the first differences GMM method is due to 
the later having a problem of weak instruments and the use of first-differences in utilizing 
instruments in levels due to the absence of information regarding parameters in the level-
variables. This leads to a loss of efficiency in the models (Arrellano and Bover, 1995). In 
addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that system GMM has dramatic efficiency gains over 
the first differences GMM method especially when estimating short sample periods with 
persistent data. This is especially true if the lagged dependent variable has a coefficient 
approaching one and the ratio of variances of   to  increases. Furthermore, the authors 
document that by including lagged first differences and lagged levels instruments in the 
instrument set, the method allows for a substantial reduction in finite sample bias due to the 
ability of the methodology to exploit additional moment conditions. The advantage of the 
approach chosen in this paper is that the methodology allows estimation in both levels and first 
differences as a result of level equations being estimated simultaneously by utilizing differences 
of lagged regressors as instruments. Thus we are able to maintain variations among firms in the 
sample whilst controlling for heterogeneity. In addition the standard errors used to measure 
significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity whilst for correcting for finite sample errors 
based on the suggested approach in Windemeijer (2005) for dynamic linear models. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We report and discuss our results in this section. Table 2 reports the regression results for 
equation (4). The estimation is done based on a static framework of target leverage levels.  The 
coefficients are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Regressions results are done based 
on the Fama and McBeth (1973) approach. The table reports mean coefficients which is the 
average slope of the annual regressions. The time series standard errors are as in Fama and 
French (2002). Column 1 uses book leverage as the dependent variable which is replaced by 
market leverage in column 2.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
We find that the market-to-book ratio has a negative coefficient and significant for both 
measures of target leverage. This suggests that firms are trying to protect future growth 
opportunities and thus choose to lower target levels. Our reports are in line with the literature 
(see Flannery and Rangan, 2006 and Warr et. al., 2012). Further confirming the findings in the 
literature, (see Mackie-Mason, 1990 and Flannery and Rangan, 2006), we find that asset 
tangibility also has a positive and significant coefficient indicating that firms which higher levels 
of fixed assets tend to have higher depreciation expenses (i.e. tax credits) as well as higher 
collateral value for securing debt. Thus these firms tend to have higher levels of debt capacity. In 
addition, we find that firm size has a positive correlation with target leverage which confirms to 
Hovakimian et al. (2001). This is due to larger firms tending to have higher levels of 
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diversification leading to a less volatile cash flow allowing more security in meeting interest 
obligations. A more stable cash flow also leads to increased levels of profitability which gives 
firms the opportunity to further exploit the tax shield of debt leading to lower levels of 
probability of bankruptcy and thus expected bankruptcy costs (see Hovakimian et al. 2001). 
Table 3 reports the results for regression for equation (5). 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
The results from table 3 further confirm that firms adjust toward target levels as the lagged 
leverage variable is significant statistically and economically. The simulated values from the 
results in table 2 and 3 are then used to estimate the speed of adjustment based on the distance 
from target leverage and is modelled as (see Warr et al, 2012 for full discussion on the 
econometric advantage of this approach rather than using baseline speed of adjustment extracted 
directly from the dynamic model): 
 
                                             (6) 
We measure the distance ( ) which is the amount the debt leverage 
must change in order to allow firms to revert to target leverage levels. In this approach, firms 
which are above their target levels have a negative distance and firms which are below their 
target levels have a positive distance. If firms adjust fully to target leverage levels in the 
following year, the value of   will be 1. We split our sample into firms which are below their 
target leverage levels and above target levels. Furthermore we interact the distance measure with 
a LOWOVER (low levels of overvaluation) dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if firms 
valuation measure is above the median for all overvalued observations and 0 otherwise. Similarly 
we interact the distance measure with HIUNDER (high levels of undervaluations) dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if valuation levels are below the median level and 0 
otherwise. Thus our model will be as follows: 
 
                                                                                                (7) 
The results for regressing the model in equation (7) are reported in table 4.  
[Insert table 4 about here] 
We report the results for regressing equation (7) in table 4 below. Our regressions control for 
unit of observation (firm level) fixed effects to allow us to remove any potential omitted firm 
factors that are time invariant which may lead to spurious correlation between speed of 
adjustment towards distance and equity mispricing as our models utilizes lead and lag variables. 
It further allows us to simultaneously control for unit level (firm) specific differences which are 
also time invariant such as potential bias due to talented management, economic shocks as well 
as specific customer characteristics to a particular firm. The results in table 4 report the 
coefficients and standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The standard errors are clustered 
based on a 2 dimensional approach: by each time unit (year) as well as each observation unit (at 
firm level) which allows the control of correlation of observations across time (year) for a given 
firm as well as correlation across firms for a given year. The results reported are robust to using 
White (1980) standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity although such robust standard 
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errors generally report smaller values leading to more significant values as the p-values would be 
smaller. Thus, we opt for the two dimensional clustered standard errors which are clustered by 
unit (firm) level as well as time (year) level over standard errors clustered by one dimension 
(Rogers, 1993) as well robust standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980).  
Column 1 and 2 confirm that firms adjust to target levels as the coefficient of the DISTANCE 
variable is statistically significant. The results indicate that the speed of adjustment ranges from 
36 – 49%. In columns 3 and 4, we include the interaction term. Our motivation draws from 
Binsbergen et al (2010) who argue that firms over target levels adjust more rapidly to target 
levels than firms below target levels as well as based on Warr et al (2012), who find that 
undervalued firms which are below target levels, adjust faster to target levels. Given the main 
notion of the paper which is motivated in the above text, we include a dummy to capture the 
effect of high levels of undervaluation. The third and fourth column shows that the interaction 
term remains significant. Our results confirm the expectations in the literature where firms adjust 
to target levels at differing speeds (see Oztekin and Flannery, 2012 and Elsas and Florysiak, 
2011). In addition our findings contradict the findings from Byoun (2008) as well as Warr et al 
(2012) who do not distinguish extent of mispricing. Thus, bulk of the adjustment to target level 
only occurs when firms’ equities are severely undervalued. The results are robust to estimating 
target leverage on both the Fama and French and Blundell and Bond framework. Similarly, 
motivated by the findings in Warr et al (2012) as well as the discussion in the text above, we 
include a different interaction term for firms above target levels in columns 5 and 6. The results 
indicate that the adjustment to target levels is only significant if equities are slightly overvalued 
as indicated by the interaction term being significant. Our findings are consistent with the 
literature which documents firms do not time the equity market in a linear manner (see Hussain 
and Jabarullah, 2013 as well as Hussain, 2014).  
In order to test for robustness of our results, we use consensus analyst forecast values to measure 
deviation from theoretical values which are obtained from Bloomberg for our sample, although 
this reduces our sample size. The results are reported in table 5 below. 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
Similar to the conclusion in table 4, we find that the interaction term is significant. Further 
confirming our earlier results, columns 5 and 6 show that the interaction term remains 
significant. Overall, our results indicates that although the market timing element could play a 
role in adjustment to target levels, the integration of both explanations of capital structure works 
within a more dynamic and complex framework than otherwise suggested in the literature.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Our paper uses unbalanced panel data of UK firms to test the integration of the timing element 
into the adjustment to target leverage levels. The main notion of the paper is that the integration 
of the two explanation of capital structure works in a non-linear manner. Drawing from the 
literature, we utilize a two-stage approach to estimate the speed of adjustment to lead (target) 
levels. The first stage is further estimated using a static and dynamic approach. The second stage 
then models the difference between the simulated lead (target) level and the lag (current) level of 
leverage to the difference between the actual lead (target) level and the actual lag (current) 
leverage levels. Our initial findings confirm the established evidence in the literature. Further 
analysis however indicates that the increase in leverage levels when firms are below target levels 
is only evident when undervaluation levels are excessive. This could be due to information 
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asymmetry reasons, agency considerations as well as managerial actions in preserving debt 
capacity (financial slack). Conversely, when looking at firms which are above target levels; we 
find that adjustment to target levels only occur when valuation levels are not severely above 
theoretical predictions. The findings indicate that the signalling effect as well as expectations of 
managers on equity prices affects timing affects which in line influences cost of adjustment to 
target levels. Overall, our results indicate that extent of equity mispricing influences timing 
decisions in a non-linear manner which affect speed of adjustment to target levels. However, our 
analysis is limited to the deviation of market prices from theoretical prices and does not consider 
the interplay between difference factors such as signalling aspect of security issues as well as 
information asymmetry consideration which are discussed above; providing a plausible direction 
for future researches in understanding how cost of equity capital influences speed of adjustment 
and the extent of integration of both explanations of capital structure to explain firms issuing 
behaviour.  
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Industry classifications 
No Industry Name 
1 Automotive, Aviation and transportation 
2 Beverages, Tobacco 
3 Building and Construction 
4 Chemicals, Healthcare, Pharmaceuticals 
5 Computer, Electrical and electronic equipment 
6 Diversified industry 
7 Engineering, Mining, Metallurgy, Oil and gas exploration 
8 Food producer and processors, Farming and fishing 
9 Leisure, Hotels, restaurants and pubs 
10 Other business 
11 Paper, Forestry, Packaging, Printing and publishing, Photography 
12 Retailers, Wholesalers and distributors 
13 Services 
14 Textile, Leather, Clothing, Footwear and furniture 
15 Utilities 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
BL 0.1794 01587 0.1672 
ML 0.2163 0.1563 0.2103 
SIZE 10.49 9.225 2.034 
MTB 1.694 1.412 1.172 
TANG 0.3343 0.3367 0.2480 
R&D 0.0204 0.0197 0.0601 
The table above provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the study. BL is book leverage 
scaled by total assets, ML is  the ratio of book value of total debt to market value of equity plus book 
value of total debt, SIZE is the natural logarithm of net sales in millions of 1993 pounds, MTB is the 
Ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity (M) to book 
value of total assets (B), R&D is research and development expenses divided by total assets and TANG is 
net plant, property and equipment over total assets. 
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Table 2: Estimating target leverage at the lead level based on the Fama and French framework. 
  1 2 
CONST 
-0.1124*** -0.0484 
(0.0340) (0.0408) 
SIZE 
0.0184*** 0.0206*** 
(0.0012) (0.0024) 
MTB 
-0.0052*** -0.0813*** 
(0.0019) (0.0045) 
TANG 
0.0987*** 0.1096*** 
(0.0167) (0.0193) 
R&D 
0.0030 0.0104 
(0.0080) (0.0108) 
RDD 
0.0405*** 0.0645*** 
(0.0108) (0.0172) 
INDL 
0.5658*** 0.7865*** 
(0.0987) (0.1944) 
Average R2 0.1624 0.2340 
F – Test  (p-values) 0.0000 0.000 
Observations  16,246 16,246 
Period 1993 – 2012 1993 – 2012 
This table provides the results for our initial analysis for target leverage based on a static framework.  
***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The dependent variable is target 
leverage (t+1). Column 1 reports results for book leverage while column 2 reports results for market 
leverage. The mean slope coefficient is the average of the slopes for the 20 annual regressions. Time-
series standard error is the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by (20)1/2, 
as in Fama and French (2002). All regressions include 15 industry dummies [0, 1]. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of net sales in millions of 1993 pounds. MTB, market-to-book ratio is defined as the ratio of 
book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity (M) to book value of total 
assets (B).TANG, asset tangibility is net plant, property and equipment over total assets. R&D (research 
and development expenses) are scaled by total assets. RDD is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
1 if R&D expenses are not reported in Datastream and zero otherwise. INDL is the median industry 
leverage of the firm.  
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Table 3: Estimating target leverage at the lead level based on the Blundell and Bond framework 
  1 2 
LEVERAGE 
0.5624*** 0.7861*** 
(0.0160) (0.0108) 
SIZE 
0.0219*** 0.0349*** 
(0.0026) (0.0062) 
MTB 
-0.0019 -0.0031*** 
(0.0022) (0.0058) 
TANG 
0.0987*** 0.1096*** 
(0.0167) (0.0193) 
R&D 
0.0016 0.0036 
(0.0104) (0.0159) 
RDD 
0.0208 0.0274 
(0.0187) (0.0231) 
INDL 
0.4827*** 0.6135*** 
(0.0705) (0.1527) 
Adjusted R2 0.5426 0.6944 
Wald test (p-values) 0.00 0.00 
Sargan test (p-values) 0.26 0.22 
Observations 16,246 16,246 
Period 1993 – 2012 1993 – 2012 
This table provides the results for our initial analysis for target leverage based on a dynamic framework.  
***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The dependent variable is target 
leverage (t+1). Column 1 reports results for book leverage while column 2 reports results for market 
leverage. The coefficients are reported based on estimation for the lead variable as the dependent variable 
and includes a lag measure of leverage as the independent variable. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and based on Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. All regressions include 15 
industry dummies [0, 1] as well as year dummies. SIZE is the natural logarithm of net sales in millions of 
1993 pounds. MTB, market-to-book ratio is defined as the ratio of book value of total assets less book 
value of equity plus market value of equity (M) to book value of total assets (B).TANG, asset tangibility 
is net plant, property and equipment over total assets. R&D (research and development expenses) are 
scaled by total assets. RDD is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if R&D expenses are not 
reported in Datastream and zero otherwise. INDL is the median industry leverage of the firm.  
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Table 4: Non-linear speed of adjustment using interaction with distance variable  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Under-levered firms Over-levered firms 
Panel A: Estimating target leveraget+1 using Fama and French framework 
DISTANCE 
0.3648*** 0.4261*** - - - - 
(0.0057) (0.0109) - - - - 
DISTANCE x 
HIUNDER 
- - 0.4697*** 0.5366*** - - 
- - (0.0124) (0.0265) - - 
DISTANCE x 
LOWOVER 
- - - - 0.4924*** 0.5824*** 
- - - - (0.0621) (0.1024) 
Adjusted R2 0.4827 0.5244 0.5755 0.6152 0.4644 0.5011 
Wald (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations  16,246 16,246 7,503 7,503 8,112 8,112 
Period 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
Panel B: Estimating target leveraget+1 using Blundell and Bond framework 
DISTANCE 
0.4198*** 0.4944*** - - - - 
(0.0308) (0.0428) - - - - 
DISTANCE x 
HIUNDER 
- - 0.5255*** 0.5828*** - - 
- - (0.0501) (0.0804) - - 
DISTANCE x 
LOWOVER 
- - - - 0.5827*** 0.6324*** 
- - - - (0.1565) (0.1819) 
Adjusted R2 0.5618 0.5824 0.6211 0.6726 0.5030 0.5264 
Wald (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations  16,246 16,246 7,856 7,856 7,642 7,642 
Period 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
This table provides the results for analysis for adjustment to target leverage.  ***, ** and * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The dependent variable is the DISTANCE from target 
leverage. Column 1, 3 and 5 reports results for book leverage while column 2, 4 and 6 reports results for 
market leverage. The coefficients are reported based on estimation for the difference between the lead and 
lag variable as the dependent variable. 2 – dimension clustered standard errors are reported in 
paranteheses which are clustered at unit (firm) and time (year) level. All regressions include 15 industry 
dummies [0, 1] as well as time (year) dummies and other known determinants of capital structure as 
discussed in the text above which serve as control variables.  
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Table 5: Robustness of results for non-linear speed of adjustment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Under-levered firms Over-levered firms 
Panel A: Estimating target leveraget+1 using Fama and French framework 
DISTANCE 
0.4244*** 0.4748*** - - - - 
(0.0082) (0.0104) - - - - 
DISTANCE x 
HIUNDER 
- - 0.4087*** 0.4367*** - - 
- - (0.0074) (0.0097) - - 
DISTANCE x 
LOWOVER 
- - - - 0.4644*** 0.5154*** 
- - - - (0.0099) (0.0142) 
Adjusted R2 0.5624 0.5829 0.4725 0.4833 0.5822 0.6127 
Wald (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations  8,240 8,240 4,250 4,250 3,852 3,852 
Period 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
Panel B: Estimating target leveraget+1 using Blundell and Bond framework 
DISTANCE 
0.4842*** 0.5243*** - - - - 
(0.0143) (0.0156) - - - - 
DISTANCE x 
HIUNDER 
- - 0.4462*** 0.5025*** - - 
- - (0.0126) (0.0145) - - 
DISTANCE x 
LOWOVER 
- - - - 0.5436*** 0.5628*** 
- - - - (0.0206) (0.0285) 
Adjusted R2 0.6240 0.6508 0.5755 0.5924 0.6523 0.6687 
Wald (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations  8,240 8,240 4,624 4,624 3,220 3,220 
Period 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
1993 – 
2012 
This table provides the results for analysis for adjustment to target leverage.  ***, ** and * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The dependent variable is the DISTANCE from target 
leverage. Column 1, 3 and 5 reports results for book leverage while column 2, 4 and 6 reports results for 
market leverage. The coefficients are reported based on estimation for the difference between the lead and 
lag variable as the dependent variable. 2 – dimension clustered standard errors are reported in 
paranteheses which are clustered at unit (firm) and time (year) level. All regressions include 15 industry 
dummies [0, 1] as well as time (year) dummies and other known determinants of capital structure as 
discussed in the text above which serve as control variables.  
 
